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The Role of Lawyers in Social Change: United States
Frank Upham*
I. THE SELECTION OF JUDGES

rIThe American ideal of a "government of laws, not men" is grounded in the concept of an independent judiciary with lifetime tenure
removable only by impeachment. Nonetheless, perhaps the most striking
characteristic of judicial selection in America is its explicitly political
nature. At the state level, many judges are elected, and the rest are appointed by the state's governor, usually on the basis of party affiliation.
At the federal level, the President appoints all judges with confirmation
by the Senate. The President limits judicial appointments almost exclusively to members of his own party, and the course of the confirmation
process depends almost entirely on the personal power of particular
senators or the political ideology of the nominee.
The politicization of judicial recruitment is defended on the basis of
democratic accountability, and virtually no one argues that American
judges should be selected solely on a narrow definition of technical
competence. Americans expect their judges to have broad experience and
knowledge of the world that is inconsistent with political innocence. It
remains true, however, that one of the continuing issues in judicial selection at both the state and federal levels is how to structure an overtly
political process to produce a judiciary that will be competent and independent as well as politically responsive.
Another distinctive aspect of judicial selection on both levels in the
United States is the age and experience of judicial nominees. Judges at
all levels from summary courts in local neighborhoods to the U.S. Supreme Court are chosen from among lawyers with extensive practical
experience. The type of experience will vary with the type of judicial
post - trial judges will normally have had extensive litigation experience
as attorneys, whereas appellate judges are drawn not only from trial
judges but also from business lawyers, politicians, or even professors.
The ten to thirty years experience after completion of education means
that American judges come to their positions as mature professionals,
which has profound implications on other criteria for their selection and
recruitment as well as for training and education.

Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
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Federal Judicial Selection
1. Size and Background of the Federal Judiciary

Over the last three decades, both the caseload and the number of
judges and other personnel in the district and appellate federal courts
have risen sharply. For example, while the number of district court judges doubled between 1900 and 1960, it more than doubled again from
1960 to 1980, and by 1990 there were close to 650 active district court
judges. In 1986, support staff was over 15,000, more than double the
number in 1970. Besides the probation staff, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and public defenders attached to each federal court, there were
1,700 law clerks, over 1,000 secretaries, 130 staff attorneys, and over
100 managers and other administrative staff;
Increasing numbers and the fear of "bureaucratization" of the judiciary have created problems in recruitment. One problem is salary. Because judges are chosen in mid-career, they often have family and other
responsibilities that require substantial salaries. This factor is exacerbated
by the practice of appointing private practitioners to the federal bench,
especially partners in large corporate law firms where they will normally
make over $300,000 per year. Both of the last two Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court have lobbied hard for increased judicial salaries, and
there have been increases in the last decade. District Court judges now
earn $96,600 a year, appellate judges earn $102,500, and associate justices of the Supreme Court $118,600. While these salaries compare favorably to those of mid-career lawyers in government service, academic
life, and many kinds of private practice, they still fall far short of being
able to attract top corporate lawyers to join the judiciary, especially at
the district court level.
2.

The Process of Selection

Federal judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. Depending on the political balance of power between the President and the senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee, which reviews
presidential nominations, the President has had more or less the ability
to pursue his own agenda. President Eisenhower, for example, was successful in resisting senatorial pressure and was able to appoint an unusually highly qualified group of judges that included a large number of
Republicans. He did so by stressing professional competence as well as
political affiliation and by involving the American Bar Association extensively in the screening of nominees. Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Kennedy, on the other hand, were more politically dependent on
powerful senators, particularly Southern Democrats. President Kennedy,
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for example was forced by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman James
Eastland of Mississippi to appoint a large number of conservative and
segregationist Southerners despite Kennedy's own commitment to civil
rights and desegregation.
In practice, the President delegates the selection of most judges to
his Department of Justice, and most presidents take a personal role only
in Supreme Court nominations. Similarly, the Senate rubber-stamps all
but the most controversial lower court nominees. It is estimated that the
Judiciary Committee spends less than five minutes per district court
nominee in most circumstances. Of 136 nominees sent to the Senate in
1985 and 1986, for example, only one did not receive Committee approval and later Senate confirmation. One reason for the lack of close
scrutiny is the role that individual senators from the state of the judicial
vacancy play in recommending or opposing nominees to the Justice
Department and the Committee. Although the absolute veto power that
"home-state" senators had in the past has declined, they still play a
large role in selection behind the scene.
When the appointment is controversial, however, the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee can become the focus of national
attention. The role of the confirmation process became especially visible
during the Reagan administration. One reason was President Reagan's
explicit vow to achieve his legal-policy goals through judicial appointments. Another was the entanglement of the Supreme Court and the
judiciary in general in the most inflammatory political issues of the day
so that even senators who were not on the Judiciary Committee became
involved. At one point, conservative senators even sent out their own
questionnaires seeking nominees' views on abortion, gun control, the
death penalty, criminal procedure (especially the exclusionary rule), affirmative action, freedom of religion (especially the constitutionality of
prayer in public schools), and other issues important to the "new right."
The peak (or nadir) of politicization of the confirmation process
probably occurred with the nomination of Robert Bork. Bork's twentyfive year career as an outspoken and prolific law professor, Solicitor
General, and Court of Appeals Judge gave his liberal opponents vast
ammunition to use against him. Unlike previous controversial nominees
like Louis Brandeis who had been similarly portrayed as radical (by the
right in Brandeis' case) but who had refused to comment publicly or
grant interviews, Bork met every challenge aggressively in the media
and through interviews, which further fanned the flames and helped
transform the televised Judiciary Committee hearings into a major media
circus. At the hearings, individual senators extracted promises from Bork
on specific issues likely to come before the Court during his tenure,
including the First Amendment, equal protection, gender discrimination,
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and abortion. Although nominees had appeared before the Committee as
witnesses since the 1920s, previous nominees had refused to answer
questions about their views on specific cases and controversies.
In the end, Bork's attempts to reassure senators about his controversial views were not successful, and he became the twelfth nominee to
be rejected by the full Senate in a formal vote. The margin of defeat,
fifty-eight to forty-two, was the largest margin ever and is probably
attributable to his eventual identification with a "new right" agenda that
frightened conservative Southern Democrats and moderate Republicans
as well as liberals. Sixteen other presidential nominees, including Douglas Ginsberg, Reagan's nominee to replace Bork, have been withdrawn
after opposition. Ironically, Ginsberg's defeat was due as much to a
personal lifestyle that offended conservatives as to an ideology that offended liberals.
Since the political wars of Bork and Ginsberg, however, the process
has returned to a less intrusive one. Two recent Supreme Court nominees, Kennedy and Souter, did not have to answer the same type of
questions or undergo the intense political scrutiny of their two predecessors. Both were confirmed without serious opposition despite conservative views.
In contrast to the overly political role of the Senate itself, the
American Bar Association has long been involved in judicial recruitment
and selection under the banner of professional competence. At first, the
ABA largely defined competence as the avoidance of progressive politics. On the state level, this meant opposing the election of judges; on
the federal level it led the ABA to oppose the confirmation of Louis
Brandeis in 1916. In the view of the six former ABA presidents who
openly attacked Brandeis, his history as a progressive and legal reformer
made him unfit to serve on the Supreme Court.
By the 1950s, however, the ABA had shifted from an assertive to a
reactive role. In 1949, it created the Standing Committee on the (federal) Judiciary to review the qualifications of nominees from the nonpolitical viewpoint of legal competence, and the relationship between the
ABA and the Justice Department in judicial selection matters was formalized under President Eisenhower. The ABA now receives the name
of prospective nominees early in the process and rates them on a four
point scale: "exceptionally well qualified," "well qualified," "qualified,"
and "unqualified." The reaction to an "unqualified" rating has varied
from administration to administration, but only under President Nixon's
Attorney General Kleindienst did the ABA have anything close to a veto
of "unqualified" nominees. In fact, in 1962 at its annual meeting after
the Kennedy administration had named eight judges deemed "unqualified," Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach "reminded" the ABA that
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"the responsibility was the President's and the Senate's, and this Association does not have and would not wish to have veto power over the
appointments to be made."
3.

The Role of Presidential Politics

What made the battle around Robert Bork exceptional was the nature of the politics involved. Whether or not it was an accurate appraisal
of Judge Bork and his record, he became the symbol of President
Reagan's promise to remake the federal judiciary in his political image.
As such, the politics of the Bork nomination were unlike the normal
politics of judicial selection, which tend to revolve around party affiliation, political involvement (and the need to reward past service to the
President, a senator, or the party), regional issues (like racial politics in
the South under Kennedy), or even the personalities of individual senators. While concerns about the political beliefs of the nominee and his
or her conduct on the bench are part of the calculus, they are often
subordinate to the selection's indirect political benefit in maintaining
party unity or rewarding the party faithful.
Judicial politics under Reagan, on the other hand, were meant not
to use judicial selection as a political reward, but to reverse what Reagan saw as a drift toward a more and more liberal bench and to "institutionalize the Reagan revolution so it can't be set aside no matter what
happens in future presidential elections." 1 From the outset of the Reagan administration, therefore, Justice Department appointments reduced
the role of both senators, including moderate Republicans, and the Bar
Association in investigation and confirmation. To many Reagan appointees within the Justice Department, the ABA was just another part of the
liberal establishment whose rating system would never be fair to conservative nominees; in one justice official's words, "we didn't think one
'second about ABA ratings." 2
To be sure that potential nominees would hew the administration's
ideological line on issues of central importance, they conducted intefisive
interviews with candidates on how they approached touchstone issues of
Reagan's social agenda: abortion, school prayer, free market economics,
and defendants' rights. Candidates put forward by Republican senators
were reportedly rejected, for example, for having supported the Equal
Rights Amendment or having made charitable donations to Planned

Attorney General Edwin Meese, quoted in D.M. O'Brien, Meese's Agenda for Ensuring
the Reagan Legacy, Los ANGELES TIMES, Opinion, Sept. 28. 1986, at 3.
2 Deputy Attorney General Bruce Fein quoted in DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUCIDICIAL SELECTION 62 (1988).
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Parenthood or gun control groups. Whether phrased as inquiries into
"judicial philosophy" or an "ideological litmus test," administration officials defended the interviews as a legitimate part of the President's
constitutional perogative to make judicial appointments and criticized previous Republican administrations for failing to take seriously enough
judicial philosophy and relying too much on "a candidate's reputation
and standing."3
President Reagan was not the first president to attempt to transform
the judiciary into a political weapon, or at least to prevent it from being
a weapon used against him. His most famous predecessor was Franklin
D. Roosevelt, whose attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court with additional justices sympathetic to the New Deal, was also initially unsuccessful. As may be true with Reagan, at least with lower federal judges,
Roosevelt was ultimately successful in fashioning a federal judiciary in
his and his party's image.
4. The Representation Issue
Another President with an explicit agenda for the federal bench was
Jimmy Carter. His goals, however, were neither strictly partisan nor
ideological. He wanted to make the federal judiciary more representative
of the population of the United States. Federal judges are overwhelmingly white male protestants, most of whom have followed a time honored
path from established law schools through prestigious private practice to
the federal bench. This path was totally unavailable to minorities, and
women for most of American history and is one explanation for the lack
of women and minorities on the bench until very recently.
President Truman appointed the first black man/person to the regular federal judiciary in 1949; Kennedy appointed the next more than ten
years later. At the end of Gerald Ford's administration in 1976, there
had been a total of twenty-two blacks appointed to the district (seventeen), appellate (four), and the supreme (one) courts. President Roosevelt
appointed the first woman, but progress was even slower than with
blacks, and by 1976 only eight women had entered the federal judiciary.
In the eight years from 1968 to 1976, Presidents Nixon and Ford together appointed only two women, although Nixon did appoint the first
Asian-American.
President Carter attempted to change this situation by instituting an
affirmative action program for the federal judiciary as explicit and aggressive as President Reagan's ideological campaign. In four years, he
appointed thirty-seven black judges, more than the total of all the presi-

IId. at 61.
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dents before 'and after him and almost fifteen percent of his total appointments. He also appointed forty women, a five fold increase over
the total appointed by his predecessors, and again over fifteen percent of
total appointees. By the end of his term, the percentage of both women
and minorities on the bench had risen considerably, although §till below
ten percent each. As would be expected given black political identification with the Democratic Party, Presidents Reagan and Bush have appointed far fewer blacks, but they have. continued the trend toward more
female appointees, including President Reagan's appointment of the first
female Supreme Court Justice.
As was Reagan's unabashed introduction of ideology into the selection process, Carter's overt use of race and sex as criteria for judicial
appointments was considered illegitimate by many commentators on the
selection process. Aside from the propriety of using race or gender as
criteria for any governmental action - the "reverse discrimination" issue
- the main concern of critics was that female and black judges would be
less qualified. This concern was undoubtably partly due to the different
backgrounds of these judges, who were considerably less likely than
their white male colleagues to have long experience in corporate private
practice. Instead, they were more likely to have had careers in public
service, criminal law, or, especially for women, legal academics. Given
the rather small role that technical legal competence has placed in judicial selection in the past, the use of criteria such as race and sex seem
unlikely to have seriously affected the merit, however defined, of
Carter's appointments. In fact, one commentator has concluded that his
non-traditional appointments had superior credentials to the overall credentials of his and his predecessors' white male appointees4
The representation issue did not begin with nor does it end with
the currently topical issues of race and gender. For most of American
history, geography greatly influenced Supreme Court appointment decisions. During the nineteenth century, regional representation aimed at
assuring respect for the distinctive cultural values of different sections of
the country was vital to the legitimacy of the court. Religion, on the
other hand, has more frequently been a barrier to appointment rather
than a basis for it. Of 104 Supreme Court justices, ninety-one have been
Protestant, with only eight Catholics and five Jews. Representation on
lower federal courts has been similar, with regional variations. In recent
years, however, neither religion nor geography has figured as strongly as
political compatibility with the President's views.

4 Sheldon Goldman, Should There be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary? 62 JUDICATURE

489, 493 (1979).
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State Judicial Selection

Many of the issues involved in the selection of federal judges are
comparable in nature if not scale for state judicial selection as well.
Problems with adequate salaries, racial, religious, and gender representation and even regional representation arise in similar ways in many
states as they do on the federal level. The tension between political
accountability and professional competence, on the other hand, appears
in a very different guise at the state level. One reason is that in many
states judges are elected not appointed; another is that the campaign for
the "merit" selection of judges has gone farther in many states than it
has at the federal level.
The dominant mode of selection of state judges has swung back
and forth from appointment to election and back to appointment since
the eighteenth century. In the early years of the Republic, judges were
either appointed by the Governor or by a select group of legislators.
Dissatisfaction with these systems arose quickly, however, and reached
national scope before the election of Andrew Jackson as President in
1828. Critics contended that an elite bench was inconsistent with popular
government and that judicial appointment had deteriorated into a political spoils system to reward loyal party stalwarts.
In 1832 Mississippi became the first state to have a completely
elected judiciary. New York followed suit in 1846, and by the first half
of the twentieth century, over seventy percent of the states were elective. In most of these, especially at the beginning, judicial candidates
were elected in the same partisan manner as those for other offices. By
1900, however, concern with the dominance of partisan politics and the
quality and operation of the judiciary led many states to replace partisan
elections with systems of nonpartisan nomination and election.
Leading the campaign for such reforms were the bar associations,
which had formed at the end of the nineteenth century and were jealous
of the parties' control over the judiciary. Nonpartisan elections, however,
were not enough for the legal profession, and in 1937 the American Bar
Association proposed the "merit selection" system, which was argued to
combine the merits of appointive and elective systems. The plan was
first adopted by Missouri (and has generally been known as the "Missouri Plan" since) in 1940 and then by three more states in the 1950s. It
was not until the 1970s, however, that the merit plan gathered significant momentum. By 1983 some form of the merit plan applied to at
least part of the judiciary in thirty-five states.'

-

MARIA N.

GREENSTEIN, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS (1964)
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Although there are many variations, the typical merit plan has three
fundamental characteristics: a nominating commission composed of both
lawyers and laypersons; appointment of judges by the governor from a
list of qualified nominees, often three, created by the commission; and
an uncontested "retention" election after a year of service whereby the
electorate can remove the appointee or grant him or her a full term in
office. Terms vary from six to sixteen years at which point there is
another retention election. Interim vacancies are filled by gubernatorial
appointment in most states, but there is often involvement by the judicial commissions at this point as well. Even in approximately half of the
states that retain some form of judicial elections, there is frequently
some variant of the merit plan for interim appointments.
Merit plans were sold to state legislators on the basis of three criticisms of an elective judiciary: elections did not recruit the best legal
talent available; they impaired the independence of the judiciary; and
they were ineffective as instruments of popular control. Whether and to
what extent the trend toward merit selection has ameliorated these problems is unclear.' The degree to which politics has been eliminated in
the process, of course, depends on the identity of the persons serving on
the judicial nominating commissions. In some instances, they are all
appointed by the governor for terms concurrent with the governor. In
others, the state bar appoints lawyer members and the governor the rest.
In most instances, however, the partisan identification of the majority of
appointees has remained that of the sitting governor.
It does seem likely, however, that the institutionalization of the role
of the profession in judicial selection has shifted the criteria for selection more toward what lawyers themselves see as ideal judicial characteristics. In this context it may be of interest to note what the American
Judicature Society has included as prime judicial characteristics in its
Handbook for Judicial Nominating Commissioners.7 Desired qualities for
all judges included suitable age, good health, impartiality, industry, integrity, professional skills, community contacts, and social awareness.
The Handbook urges commissioners to seek further in appellate judges
the qualities of collegiality and writing ability and in trial judges decisiveness, judicial temperament, and speaking ability. What is notable is
the non-technical nature of these criteria - except for professional skills,
all would be as valuable in any public servant as in a judge. Even in its

(tables I through III at 5-20 provide a schematic presentation of all state merit plans in force in

1984).
6

Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for Account-

ability (1980) (the only empirical study that might be available).
7 GREENMSIN, supra note 5, at 65-82.
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breakdown of professional skills, the Handbook stresses experience over
specialized knowledge or particular education or training.
I1.

THE EDUCATION OF JUDGES

Because of the pattern of judicial selection from among mid-career
practitioners, the educational needs of American judges are quite different than they would be if judges entered the judiciary at a young age
with little or no practical experience. Given that American judges have
had ten to thirty years of extensive practical experience before going on
the bench, they are initially as familiar with new technologies, changing
social arrangements, and current developments within the profession as
are practicing lawyers. Trial judges have usually been experienced litigators and are very familiar with the specific problems facing trial courts.
Appellate judges usually have extensive experience in either business
practice, which often means close involvement with business strategy as
well as purely legal questions, or in public service as bureaucrats or
politicians. As such, most are familiar and comfortable with commercial,
business, or economic issues and with the considerations that enter into
the policy related litigation that has increased in recent years.
The formal education of judges is identical to that of all legal professionals. Prospective lawyers first complete a four year general university education, then enter a three year postgraduate course at a law school, usually attached to a university. The majority of students contemplating law school concentrate their undergraduate education in fields such
as political science (or another social science), history, or English, but
some major in the sciences and engineering, and some in business or
accounting. About half of entering law students have had some practical
experience after university, usually two to three years of work, but there
are also many students who enter law school in their thirties or even
forties. Very few if any of these students are likely to hold any strong
intention to become judges as opposed to any of the other career paths
available to the legal profession.
Law school education requires three years. The curriculum makes
no attempt to prepare students for a career in the judiciary, and there is
no perceived need to do so. There are usually elective courses which
address issues concerning the judiciary and perhaps an externship program that places students within judges' chambers, but these courses are
intended to familiarize students with the legal system, not prepare them
to become judges. Since virtually all American judges will have served
as practicing lawyers for extended periods before taking the bench, law
faculties feel that any special preparation for a judicial career would be
misguided. Furthermore, since appointment to the bench is subject to
political fortune as well as training, capability, or ambition, special at-
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tention to those students who expressed an interest in a judicial career
would be misplaced. Also, most American law professors feel that the
case method of instruction, which still dominates the law school curriculum, is excellent preparation for the legal reasoning skills called upon
by the judiciary.
Education aimed specifically at the judiciary, therefore, begins after
lawyers become judges. Because of the wide diversity of backgrounds
and the fact that the students are also full time judges, education is
generally confined to short conferences, workshops, or mini-courses
similar to the continuing legal education courses available to practicing
lawyers. These programs began on a national scale in the 1950s with
the first Appellate Judges Seminar jointly sponsored by the Institute of
Judicial Administration and New York Law School. In the 1990s, a host
of programs are available: Judicial College, the Federal Judicial Center,
the Institute for Court Management, the American Academy of Judicial
Education, and the ABA's Appellate Judges Seminars. In addition to
national efforts, most states have some type of on-going judicial education programs. In Arizona, for example, all judges and judicial personnel
are required to receive sixteen hours of training each year. The topics
covered in such sessions vary widely, from litigation management techniques to the treatment of scientific evidence to metaphysical inquiries
into when a judge should depart from the statutes and precedents and
rely on considerations of justice.
I.

THE TASKS OF JUDGES

In an article published in 1982, Chief Justice William Burger of the
Supreme Court of the United States referred to the "litigation explosion"
afflicting the courts and reflected that:
One reason our courts have become overburdened is that Americans
are increasingly turning to the courts for relief from a range of personal distresses and anxieties. Remedies for personal wrongs that once
were considered the responsibility of institutions other than the courts
are now boldly asserted as legal "entitlement." The courts have been
expected to fill the void created by the decline of church, family, and
neighborhood unity.'
A series of empirical assumptions are implied in this comment. The
first is that American courts are overburdened. The second is that they
are overburdened because there has been a rapid increase in the use of
Swarren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 ABA J. 274 (1982) quoted in Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
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the courts by Americans. The third is that Americans use courts because
they are abnormally litigious. Usually the last assumption is implicitly
made relative to both American society of the past and to other contemporary societies. To a large extent these assumptions are shared by
foreign observers of the American legal system.
Despite almost virtual unanimity among commentators, there is
some doubt as to whether and to what degree these assumptions are empirically valid. What empirical work that has been done appears to indicate that there has been a dramatic increase in the use of federal courts,
but that the situation for state courts, which handle almost ninety-eight
percent of all cases, may be substantially different.9 Indeed, there is
some indication that Americans were more litigious in the early 19th
century than they are today. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Burger's view is
almost universally accepted by the general population and drives much
of the discussion of the problems of the judiciary today.
A.

Alternative Dispute Resolution within the Court System

One of the responses to perceived overcrowding and litigiousness
has been the attempt to provide a wider array of dispute resolution
alternatives to litigants and prospective litigants within the framework of
the traditional court system. Growing numbers of jurisdictions have
begun to encourage or require litigants to participate in some variation
of mediation or arbitration before they may go to trial. Courts in several
large cities, with the encouragement of the American Bar Association,
have instituted "multidoor courthouse" programs modeled after a suggestion made by Professor Frank Sander of Harvard Law School in 1976.
Instead of just one "door" leading to the courtroom, a multidoor courthouse has many doors through which individuals might pass to get to
the most appropriate "room." Among the doors might be one labeled
"arbitration," "mediation," and "ombudsman." Provisions would also be
made for channeling disputes into existing specialized tribunals such as
medical malpractice screening boards, small claim courts, or juvenile
courts.' 0
In most of these schemes, ADR is not meant to replace litigation
but make it more efficient and effective. One goal is to increase the
chance of settlement at an early stage. It is thought that ADR can enhance the effectiveness of settlement by providing an opportunity for a
neutral assessment of the case without any unilateral concessions. After

9 The best work on this general question of litigiousness and the use of the courts is Galanter, supra note 8.
I See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 225-43, 514-17 (1985).
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both sides are forced to consider compromise and what might happen if
the case went to full adjudication at an early stage of the litigation, the
chances of a workable settlement are increased dramatically. Court-annexed arbitration is one such device that is being adopted in many jurisdictions. Unlike voluntary arbitration, the result may be appealed to a de
novo trial by either party, but actual use of this option has been infrequent. Even when the arbitration award itself has been rejected by one
of the parties, studies have shown that the process of arbitration has led
to eventual settlement in over ninety percent of the cases.
Addressing court congestion through limiting jurisdiction and requiring resort to alternative dispute mechanisms are not without their critics,
however. Some argue that it will result in diminished access for groups
like minorities, the poor, or prisoners. Others, like Yale Professor Owen
Fiss, argue that viewing litigation as dispute resolution, and thus replaceable by ADR, misses litigation's more important role of creating social
values and norms.11 As a result of these concerns, the majority of
ADR schemes are most often used to resolve private disputes rather than
difficult public law issues. Indeed, proponents argue that by diverting
relatively minor private disputes from the courts, court-annexed ADR
enables the courts to spend more time on the difficult policy questions
now frequently brought before them.
Whatever the reservations, state legislators are rapidly enacting
legislation to encourage, require, or regulate ADR in disputes ranging
from determining child custody to siting hazardous waste facilities to
foreclosing on farm property. One 1988 survey of state laws listed over
200 statutes dealing with non-labor'ADR, two-thirds of which dated
from 1980.12
B. Judicial Reforms Aimed at Reduction of Expense and Delay
The second prong of the response to perceived excessive expense
and delay in litigation is the more efficient handling of cases that do go
to full adjudication. As with the institution of ADR techniques, there are
many variations among the fifty-one jurisdictions in the United States,
but many include some or all of the litigation management techniques
incorporated in the "civil justice expense and delay reduction plans"
required for federal district courts by the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 (Title I of the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990).
One element of each plan is case tracking, which encompasses

"
12

Owen
LINDA

iss, Against Settlement 93 YALE L.J. 1073-90 (1984).

R. SINGER, SETrLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLIION IN BUSINESS, FAMILIES,
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 166 (1990).
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categorizing cases and then giving them differential treatment based on
their complexity. The State of New Jersey has experimented with a
three-track system that increased the number of civil cases disposed of
within six months of filing from seven to eighteen percent. During the
same period, eighty-seven percent of cases were terminated within a
year of filing, comparable to the ABA's goal of disposing of ninety
percent within one year. A second section of the 1990 Act provides
additional techniques for the control of discovery and of pretrial motions
and the setting of firm trial dates. The Act also establishes advisory
committees made up of attorneys and other representatives of major
litigant categories to assess the status of the court's civil and criminal
dockets and make recommendations for the expense and delay reduction
plans.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Judicature, the journal of the American Judicature Society and The
Judges' Journal, the quarterly of the Judicial Administration Division of
the American Bar Association, are both informal "trade journals" for the
American judiciary. They publish articles of general concern to judges
and are an excellent way to determine what issues are of importance to
the judiciary at a given time.
In the section on the selection of federal judges, I drew heavily
from David M. O'Brien, Judicial Roulette: Report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Judicial Selection. It provides a concise
(106 pages), well researched, and very readable overview of the selection process with a critical emphasis on its political character and concrete suggestions for reform. It is also an excellent bibliographical
source. For a firsthand account of the confirmation process by one of its
most famous victims, see Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law (1965), although somewhat outdated,
remains a standard critical work on the role of the ABA in judicial
selection.
Maria N. Greenstein, Handbook for Judicial Nominating Commissioners (1984) offers a blueprint for the operation of judicial commissions in the merit selection of state judges. It is published by the American Judicature Society and gives several suggestions for emphasizing
merit over politics in judicial selection. Richard A. Watson and Rondal
G. Downing, The Politics of the Bench and the Bar: Judicial Selection
Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan (1969), and Philip L.
Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for
Accountability (Texas: 1980), are thorough empirical studies of merit
selection in one state and state judicial elections, respectively. Bertram
Harnett, a New York state judge, provides an entertaining account of
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judicial election campaigns in Law, Lawyers, and Laymen 217-21
(1984). Doris Marie Provine, Credentials: Nonlawyer Judges and the
Politics of Professionalism (1986), presents an interesting account and
defense of the lay judges' role in the United States.
Although out of date for this fast moving subject, perhaps the best
place to start for a comprehensive discussion of alternative dispute resolution in America is Stephen B. Goldberg, Eric D. Green, and Frank
E.A. Sander, Dispute Resolution (1985) and its 1987 Supplement. It is
intended as a textbook and contains excerpts from the leading works on
ADR presented in a well edited and intelligent manner. It also incldues
an extensive bibliography. A more up to date, but less comprehensive
source is Linda R. Singer, Settling Disputes: Conflict Resolution in
Business, Families, and the Legal System (1990). Thomas E.
Carbonneau, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Melting the Lances and
Dismounting the Steeds (1989) presents a different point of view. Containing Legal Costs: ADR Strategies for Corporations,Law Firms, and
Government (1988), edited by Fine and Plapinger and published by the
Center for Public Resources, is not immediately relevant to judicial
ADR, but it contains a wealth of short articles introducing ADR programs used by companies, law firms, and governments.
The best place to begin for discussion of the "litigation explosion"
and the question of litigiousness in the United States is Marc Galanter,
"Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society", 31 UCLA Law Review 4 (1983). Its companion article by
Professors David Trubek, Austin Sarat, William Felstiner, Herbert
Kritzer, and Joel Grossman of the Civil Litgation Research Project, "The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation," 31 UCLA Law Review 4 (1983), is also
excellent.
Detailed information on the backgrounds of individual judges is
available in The American Judciary (state and federal) and Almanac of
the Federal Judicary (federal circuit and district court judges).

